Shootdown_of_Flight_655 Iran_Air_Flight_655

1 shootdown of flight 655

1.1 nationalities of victims
1.2 u.s. government accounts
1.3 iranian government account
1.4 independent sources

shootdown of flight 655

locater map depicting iran air 655 s origination point, destination , approximate location of shootdown. (the air corridor not direct path.)

the plane, airbus a300b2 (registration ep-ibu), flown captain mohsen rezaian, 37, veteran pilot 7,000 hours of flight time, left bandar abbas @ 10:17 am iran time (utc +03:30), 27 minutes after scheduled departure time. should have been 28-minute flight. after takeoff, directed bandar abbas tower turn on transponder , proceed on persian gulf. flight assigned routinely commercial air corridor amber 59, 20-mile (32 km)-wide lane on direct line dubai airport. short distance made simple flight pattern: climb 14,000 feet (4,300 m), cruise short time, , descend dubai. airliner transmitting correct transponder squawk code typical of civilian aircraft , maintained radio contact in english appropriate air traffic control facilities.

aegis screen displays in combat information center aboard vincennes

on morning of 3 july, vincennes passing through strait of hormuz returning escort duty. helicopter uss vincennes reported received small arms fire iranian patrol vessels observed high altitude. cruiser moved engage iranian vessels, in course of violated omani waters , left after being challenged , ordered leave royal navy of oman warship. vincennes pursued iranian gunboats, entering iranian territorial waters open fire. uss sides , uss elmer montgomery nearby. thus, uss vincennes in iranian territorial waters @ time of incident, admitted government in legal briefs , publicly admiral william crowe on nightline. admiral crowe denied u.s. government coverup of incident , claimed vincennes s helicopter on international waters initially, when first fired upon iranian gunboats.

contrary accounts of various uss vincennes crew members, shipboard aegis combat system aboard vincennes recorded iranian airliner climbing @ time , radio transmitter squawking on mode iii civilian code only, rather on military mode ii.

after receiving no response multiple radio challenges, , assuming aeroplane iranian f-14 tomcat diving attack profile, uss vincennes fired 2 surface-to-air missiles @ airliner. 1 of missiles hit airliner, exploded , fell in fragments water. on board killed.

the event sparked intense international controversy, iran condemning u.s. attack. in mid-july 1988, iranian foreign minister ali akbar velayati asked united nations security council condemn united states saying u.s. attack not have been mistake , criminal act , atrocity , massacre . george h. w. bush, @ time vice president of united states in reagan administration, defended country @ united nations arguing u.s. attack had been wartime incident , crew of vincennes had acted appropriately situation. soviet union asked u.s. withdraw area , supported efforts security council end iran–iraq war. of remainder of 13 delegates spoke supported u.s. position, saying 1 of problems 1987 resolution end iran-iraq war had been ignored. following debate, security council resolution 616 passed expressing deep distress on u.s. attack , profound regret loss of human lives, , stressing need end iran–iraq war resolved in 1987.

nationalities of victims

according documents submitted international court of justice iran, aircraft carrying 290 people: 274 passengers , crew of 16. of these 290, 254 iranian, 13 emiratis, 10 indians, 6 pakistanis, 6 yugoslavs , 1 italian.

u.s. government accounts

a missile departs forward launcher of vincennes during 1987 exercise. forward launcher used in downing of iran air 655.

according u.s. government, vincennes mistakenly identified iranian airliner attacking military fighter. officers misidentified flight profile being flown airbus a300b2 being similar of f-14a tomcat during attack run; however, ship s own aegis combat system recorded flight plan of iranian airliner climbing (not descending in attack run) @ time of incident. commercial flight had originated @ bandar abbas, served dual roles base iranian f-14 operations , hub commercial, civilian flights. according same reports, vincennes tried unsuccessfully contact approaching aircraft, 7 times on military emergency frequency , 3 times on civilian emergency frequency, never on air traffic control frequencies. civilian aircraft not equipped pick military frequencies , messages on civilian emergency channel have been directed @ aircraft. more confusion arose hailed speed ground speed, while pilot s instruments displayed airspeed, 50-knot (93 km/h) difference.

at 10:24 am, civilian jet 11 nautical miles (20 km) away, vincennes fired 2 sm-2mr surface-to-air missiles, 1 of hit airliner. after attack, vincennes crew realized plane had been civilian airliner.

this version finalized in report admiral william fogarty, entitled formal investigation circumstances surrounding downing of iran air flight 655 on 3 july 1988 (the fogarty report ) parts of report have been released (part in 1988 , part ii in 1993). fogarty report stated, data uss vincennes tapes, information uss sides , reliable intelligence information, corroborate fact [iran air flight 655] on normal commercial air flight plan profile, in assigned airway, squawking mode iii 6760, on continuous ascent in altitude take-off @ bandar abbas shoot-down .

when questioned in 2000 bbc documentary, u.s. government stated in written answer believed incident may have been caused simultaneous psychological condition amongst 18 bridge crew of vincennes called scenario fulfillment , said occur when persons under pressure. in such situation, men carry out training scenario, believing reality while ignoring sensory information contradicts scenario. in case of incident, scenario attack lone military aircraft.

iranian government account

according iranian government, shooting down of ir 655 vincennes intentionally performed , unlawful act. if there mistaken identification, iran has not accepted, argues constituted gross negligence , recklessness amounting international crime, not accident.

in particular, iran expressed skepticism claims of mis-identification, noting vincennes had advanced aegis radar correctly tracked flight , mode iii beacon; 2 other u.s. warships in area, sides , montgomery, identified aircraft civilian; , flight within recognized international air corridor. noted crew of vincennes trained handle simultaneous attacks hundreds of enemy aircraft. iran found more plausible vincennes hankered opportunity show stuff .

according iran, u.s. had issued notice airmen (notam) warning aircraft @ risk of defensive measures if had not been cleared regional airport , if came within 5 nautical miles (9.3 km) of warship @ altitude of less 2,000 feet (610 m). ir 655 had been cleared regional airport , outside limits when attacked. if plane had been iranian f-14, iran argued u.s. not have had right shoot down, flying within iranian airspace , did not follow path considered attack profile, nor did illuminate vincennes radar. prior incident, vincennes had entered iranian territorial waters, , inside iranian territorial waters when launched missiles. had crew of ir 655 made mistakes, u.s. government remained responsible actions of crew of vincennes, under international law.

iran pointed out in past united states has steadfastly condemned shooting down of aircraft, whether civil or military, armed forces of state , cited el al flight 402, libyan arab airlines flight 114 , korean air lines flight 007, among other incidents. iran noted when iraq attacked uss stark, united states found iraq responsible on grounds iraqi pilot knew or should have known attacking u.s. warship.

independent sources

u.s. secretary of defense frank carlucci , chairman of joint chiefs of staff admiral william crowe brief media representatives @ pentagon shootdown on 19 august 1988.

john barry , roger charles of newsweek wrote in 13 july 1992 article rogers acted recklessly , without due care. however, subsequent fogarty report concluded rogers acted in prudent manner based on information available him, , short time frame involved. acted according prescribed rules of engagement usn warship captains in situation.

they accused u.s. government of cover-up, admiral crowe denied knowledge. analysis of events international strategic studies association described deployment of aegis cruiser in zone irresponsible , felt value placed on aegis cruisers navy had played major part in setting of low threshold opening fire. vincennes had been nicknamed robocruiser crew members , other navy ships, both in reference aegis system, , supposed aggressive tendencies of captain.

the international court of justice case relating airbus attack, aerial incident of july 3, 1988, (islamic republic of iran v. united states of america) , dropped on 22 february 1996 following settlement , reparations united states.

captain william rogers

three years after incident, admiral william j. crowe admitted on american television show nightline vincennes inside iranian territorial waters when launched missiles. contradicted earlier navy statements. international civil aviation organization (icao) report of december 1988 placed uss vincennes (cg-49) inside iran s territorial waters.

commander david carlson, commanding officer of uss sides, warship stationed nearest vincennes @ time of incident, reported have said destruction of aircraft marked horrifying climax captain rogers s aggressiveness, first seen 4 weeks ago . comment referred incidents on 2 june, when rogers had sailed vincennes close iranian frigate undertaking lawful search of bulk carrier, launched helicopter within 2–3 miles (3.2–4.8 km) of iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring four-mile (6.4 km) separation, , opened fire on small iranian military boats. of incidents, carlson commented, why want aegis cruiser out there shooting boats? wasn t smart thing do. said iranian forces had encountered in area month prior incident pointedly non-threatening , professional. @ time of rogers s announcement higher command going shoot down plane, carlson reported have been thunderstruck: said folks around me, why, hell doing? went through drill again. f-14. s climbing. damn thing @ 7,000 feet. carlson thought vincennes might have more information, , unaware rogers had been wrongly informed plane diving. carlson reported have written in u.s. naval proceedings had wondered aloud in disbelief on hearing of vincennes s intentions, speculating ship, known robo cruiser aggressiveness, felt need prove viability of aegis in persian gulf, , hankered opportunity show stuff.

craig, morales , oliver, in slide presentation published in m.i.t. s spring 2004 aeronautics & astronautics uss vincennes incident , commented captain rogers had undeniable , unequivocal tendency towards call picking fight. on own initiative, rogers moved vincennes 50 miles (80 km) northeast join uss montgomery. angry captain richard mckenna, chief of surface warfare commander of joint task force, ordered rogers abu musa, vincennes helicopter pilot, lt. mark collier, followed iranian speedboats retreated north, taking fire:

...the vincennes jumps fray. heading towards majority of speedboats, unable clear target. also, speedboats milling in own territorial waters. despite clear information contrary, rogers informs command gunboats gathering speed , showing hostile intent , gains approval fire upon them @ 0939. finally, in fateful decision, crosses 12-nautical-mile (22 km) limit off coast , enters illegally iranian waters.